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Abstract 14 
 15 
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges confronting the international 16 
community requiring action to achieve deep cuts in carbon emissions.  The 17 
implementation of potentially uncomfortable but necessary policy measures is, 18 
though, critically dependent upon public acceptability.  This paper reports a 19 
novel application of stated preference techniques to explore the influence of 20 
key design attributes on the acceptability of a personal carbon trading scheme 21 
in isolation and when compared to a carbon tax.  Illustrative forecasts from the 22 
models developed indicate the importance of design attributes, especially the 23 
basis of the initial permit allocation for personal carbon trading and the use to 24 
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which revenues are put for carbon tax.  Results indicate that the “best” 25 
scheme designs could be acceptable to a majority of respondents. 26 
 27 
 28 
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1. Introduction 34 
 35 
In the light of compelling evidence of the need to make very deep cuts in 36 
greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC, 2007; Stern, 2006), the UK Government 37 
has committed to an 80% cut by 2050 relative to 1990 levels (Climate Change 38 
Act, 2008).  Transport and domestic energy are the only sectors where 39 
emissions in 2006 exceeded those of 1990 (DECC/Defra, 2009) and together 40 
personal transport and domestic energy account for 42% of UK CO2 41 
emissions (DTI, 2007). This scenario is typical of the challenges facing many 42 
developed countries. 43 
 44 
Personal Carbon Trading (PCT) offers a potentially powerful and innovative 45 
instrument with which to achieve demanding reductions in carbon emissions 46 
and has aroused interest at national government level in the UK (Defra, 47 
2008a). PCT is a downstream trading mechanism normally understood to 48 
involve an initial allocation of carbon permits to individuals based on carbon 49 
reduction targets, with individuals able to buy and sell permits according to 50 
their desired carbon consumption and prevailing permit prices. However, the 51 
precise structure of a scheme could vary considerably given the potential 52 
range of additional design features including management of individual carbon 53 
accounts, market operation, regulation, permit allocation, scope of coverage 54 
and transaction costs. Policy makers would be interested in which scheme 55 
designs have the greatest acceptability amongst the general public.  56 
 57 
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PCT’s natural downstream comparator policy instrument is the conceptually 58 
familiar Carbon Tax (CT) applied to consumer products. In accordance with 59 
Weitzman (1974), tradable permits and taxes are theoretically equivalent in 60 
terms of both efficiency and effectiveness. It is better to fix the price through a 61 
tax where there is uncertainty over the cost function and to fix the quantity 62 
through a tradable system when there is uncertainty over the damage function 63 
(Montero, 2002; Pizer, 2002). Recent work on trading and tax has looked at 64 
political economy aspects and concentrated on welfare effects and political 65 
acceptability (e.g. Babiker et al., 2003; Brannlund and Nordstrom, 2004; Crals 66 
and Vereeck; 2005, Dinan and Rogers; 2002, Parry and Small, 2005; Pezzey, 67 
2003; West and Williams, 2004). The use of collected revenues and the way 68 
permits are allocated have been identified as the main determinants of 69 
distributional impacts and consequent political acceptability1.  70 
 71 
In the specific case of personal transport and domestic energy usage the 72 
theoretical case for permits over tax might then depend upon: the presence of 73 
a steep damage function where the costs of error are high, relative sensitivity 74 
to price and quantity signals, heterogeneity amongst consumers and the 75 
relative acceptability of different measures (Raux, 2008). 76 
 77 
In the context of climate change the damage function is uncertain and 78 
potentially steep with high costs of missing abatement targets; price 79 
elasticities of demand for both vehicle fuel and domestic energy are low 80 
(Baranzini et al., 2000; Brons et al., 2008, Dimitropoulos et al., 2005). There is 81 
                                                 
1 For a complete account of theoretical differences and equivalence between the two 
schemes please see Pezzey (2003) and Crals and Vereeck (2005) 
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a high degree of variation in emissions levels within as well as between 82 
countries (Brand and Boardman, 2006; Druckman and Jackson, 2008; 83 
Ermoliev et al., 2000). All these aspects combine to push the arguments 84 
towards tradable permits. Whilst the set up, administration and management 85 
costs of such a scheme are anticipated to be high, they might be expected to 86 
fall over time as in the case of road user charging systems (Raux, 2008), but 87 
are still likely to be higher than the costs of implementing a CT. The 88 
arguments in favour of CT generally focus on the clarity of the price signal, the 89 
ease of implementation and the generation and use of revenues for 90 
distributional purposes (Baranzini et al., 2000).  91 
 92 
Individual involvement in environmental policy has been advocated in various 93 
recent studies (Ahlheim and Schneider, 2002; Israel, 2007; Malueg and Yates, 94 
2006; Rousse, 2008; Shammin and Bullard, 2009). A PCT scheme appears to 95 
have the potential to target individually generated carbon emissions by taking 96 
into account source heterogeneity and providing visibility to fuel and energy 97 
consumption.   98 
 99 
However, whilst theory might provide some insights into the attractiveness of 100 
PCT and CT, it is ultimately personal preference that determines their 101 
acceptability and the impact of specific scheme features on this acceptability. 102 
Some PCT scheme designs might be regarded as fairer (for example, with 103 
respect to the way permits are allocated) and allowing more personal choice 104 
(for example, the ability to bank permits for the future or retire them) but at the 105 
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expense of lesser privacy and being administratively more burdensome. 106 
Perceived effectiveness might also influence acceptability. 107 
 108 
These are empirical questions that this novel research seeks to answer 109 
through the application of Stated Preference (SP) methods in what, as far as 110 
we are aware, is the first study of its kind. We note that the statement of 111 
Roberts and Thumin (2006) that “little study (if any) appears to have been 112 
devoted to exploring more fundamental questions such as the basis on which 113 
the public might judge the acceptability of a scheme” has since been echoed 114 
by the UK Environmental Audit Committee (House of Commons, 2008a) and 115 
Kerr and Battye (2008).   116 
 117 
2. Experience to date 118 
 119 
Researchers have examined the potential for the introduction of tradable 120 
permits in the transport and/or domestic energy sectors and in some cases 121 
economy wide (Defra, 2008a; Dresner and Ekins, 2004; Fleming 2005; 122 
Harwatt, 2008; Hillman, 2004; Niemeier et al., 2008; Raux, 2008; Starkey and 123 
Anderson, 2005; Verhoef et al., 1997; Wadud et al., 2008; Zanni and Bristow, 124 
2009).  These studies have focused on theory, implementation, distributional 125 
effects, scheme design and to a lesser extent behavioural response. 126 
 127 
A small but growing number of studies, largely in the UK, have addressed the 128 
acceptability of PCT and in some cases CT (Bird et al., 2009; Capstick and 129 
Lewis 2009; Energy Saving Trust, 2007; Harwatt, 2008; Howell, 2008; Jagers 130 
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et al., 2009; Owen et al., 2008; Von Knobelsdorff, 2008; Wallace, 2009, 131 
YouGov, 2006a and 2006b). Approaches vary from highly qualitative focus 132 
groups and in-depth interviews to postal and internet surveys and national 133 
polls.  Support for PCT lies in the range 25 to 47%2.  Most of these studies do 134 
not use hypothecation or revenue recycling in the CT option nor do they 135 
mention the higher costs of PCT. Nevertheless, this level of expressed 136 
support for what is after all a very unfamiliar idea provides a promising base 137 
from which to explore acceptability.  Polling evidence suggests that support 138 
for green taxes increases with hypothecation of revenues, especially if 139 
directed to tax cuts and environmental or energy expenditures, when support 140 
can exceed 70% (BBC, 2007; Green Fiscal Commission, 2007; Ipsos Mori, 141 
2006; YouGov, 2006c).  However, most work to date on the acceptability of 142 
PCT or CT has asked for responses to fixed designs.  No studies to date have 143 
systematically explored the impact of varying design features on acceptability.  144 
 145 
It therefore seems sensible to draw from and build upon the experience 146 
accumulated over many years from studies of public acceptability of road user 147 
charging schemes (Jaensirisak et al., 2005).  Here the key lesson is that SP 148 
methods are highly suitable, since ‘policy packages’ can be composed as a 149 
selection of clearly specified, relevant scheme attributes whose levels are 150 
varied in a controlled manner to allow, through appropriate statistical analysis, 151 
the estimation of how the different levels of each of the scheme attributes 152 
influence overall acceptability.     153 
 154 
                                                 
2 This excludes two highly qualitative pieces, with non-representative samples that report very 
high levels of support at 77% and 91% and a national poll with 61% support where the 
question was perhaps not sufficiently representative of PCT. 
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3. Survey design 155 
 156 
We here provide a brief description of the SP method which involves a series 157 
of choices between two hypothetical PCT scenarios or hypothetical PCT and 158 
CT scenarios, and then we set out the attributes and levels used to 159 
characterise PCT and the CT within these SP experiments and the reasons 160 
for their selection. We then detail the experimental design.  The initial scheme 161 
descriptions presented to respondents are shown in Appendix A. 162 
 163 
3.1 SP Methods 164 
SP experiments offer respondents a series of hypothetical scenarios each 165 
made up of two or more options. In turn, these options are composed of 166 
relevant attributes and the evaluation of the options, by the respondent 167 
expressing a preference for one option over the other(s), indicates the 168 
importance attached to each attribute. The statistical analysis of the 169 
responses supplied serves two broad purposes. It reveals the utility weight 170 
attached to each attribute, which is central to decisions relating to product 171 
design and willingness to pay, and it underpins the forecasting of behavioural 172 
response to new products or amended designs and prices.  173 
 174 
SP methods can take the form of ranking, rating or choice exercises, with the 175 
latter now dominating and typically offering between 8 and 12 choices 176 
between two options each characterised by between 3 and 5 attributes. Their 177 
background lies in marketing research and over the past 40 years there has 178 
been extensive application to consumer goods and services in a wide range of 179 
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market settings, with increasing application in recent years to non-traded 180 
products such as environmental goods and general ‘quality of life’ factors. We 181 
are here interested in its novel application to non-market products, in this 182 
context relating to policy measures which were also the subject of early 183 
applications (Donnelly et al, 1976; Eberts and Koeppel, 1977; Hoinville, 1971). 184 
However, we are not aware of any previous application of SP to assess the 185 
acceptability of PCT or CT schemes.  186 
 187 
3.2 PCT design attributes 188 
Some elements of scheme design were fixed, including the free annual 189 
carbon allowance of 4 tonnes of CO2 per person, similar to the actual average 190 
level of 4.25 tonnes (DTI, 2007). All respondents completed the “ACT on CO2” 191 
carbon calculator (Defra, 2007a) to estimate their emissions from domestic 192 
energy and transport3. Thus all respondents were aware of their starting point 193 
with respect to emissions and hence the impact of the proposed scheme on 194 
them personally.  195 
 196 
The attributes and levels selected to compose PCT schemes, with the 197 
wording used in the survey, are given in Table 1. Note that in many cases we 198 
have no a priori expectations of the relative importance of the different 199 
attribute levels due to the novelty of the schemes and since individuals’ 200 
circumstances vary as will the extent to which individual or social 201 
considerations might influence preferences.  In determining the levels for 202 
different attributes we sought to capture the range of proposals in the 203 
                                                 
3 The carbon calculator does not include bus, rail or tram emissions, but as these amount to 
only 2% of total transport emissions this was an acceptable limitation. 
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literature and in some cases to offer more extreme variants to generate a wide 204 
range of attribute levels and responses. 205 
 206 
Table 1 about here 207 
 208 
Permit Allocation:  An equal per capita allowance gives an equal right to 209 
pollute or responsibility not to and lies behind the contraction and 210 
convergence approach to reducing global emissions (Royal Commission on 211 
Environmental Pollution, 2000). There is continuing debate as to whether 212 
parents should receive additional permits for their children (Dresner and 213 
Ekins, 2004; Hillman 2004; Starkey and Anderson, 2005). We have specified 214 
an allocation that gives an equal allowance to all adults (AADULT), one that 215 
additionally provides a child allowance equal to that for adults (AINDCHILD) 216 
and one with a child allowance set at 40% of the adult allowance (AIND40). 217 
As an alternative to a per capita allowance, we have also included an equal 218 
allowance to each household (AHOUSE).  219 
 220 
Permit allocation to industry through the European Trading System has 221 
reflected historic emissions (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007). An allocation 222 
based on current consumption (ACONS) was included to establish whether 223 
individual preferences recognise the ‘rights’ of high emitters (Seyfang et al., 224 
2007).  225 
 226 
Although a PCT scheme would be progressive in its overall impact, some 227 
lower income households would almost inevitably lose out (Thumin and White 228 
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2008), including those with higher energy needs through disability, poor 229 
housing or location relative to facilities.  The principle of equal per capita 230 
allocation has been questioned partly on the grounds of unequal needs 231 
(Starkey, 2008). Equity is addressed here through higher allocations 232 
(AEXTNEED) or financial support (AFINNEED) to those with greater need and 233 
an allocation based on Government assessment of need (AGOVT).  These 234 
levels are used to assess whether there is a difference in the acceptability of 235 
financial (AFINNEED) and effectively in-kind support (AEXTNEED).  The 236 
acceptability of AGOVT may be different for two possible reasons. Firstly, 237 
respondents may think that a Government assessment of need would not 238 
align with that described under AEXTNEED and AFINNEED and might be 239 
politically determined.  Secondly, the response may vary simply because of 240 
distrust of Government. 241 
 242 
Excess Permits: An emerging issue from qualitative work is that some low 243 
emitters would rather keep or retire permits than let high emitters have them 244 
(Harwatt, 2008; Prescott, 2007). In general, we might expect individuals with 245 
excess permits to prefer to have choices on the disposal of permits rather 246 
than to have forced trading.  247 
 248 
Thus the levels specified include two with an implied degree of forced 249 
participation whereby permits must be sold in the market (EMKT) or must be 250 
sold in the market or donated to charity (EMKTCHY).  The other levels allow 251 
for private sales (EPRIV) or provide a choice between selling, donation and 252 
destruction (ECHOOSE). 253 
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 254 
Permit life: Individuals may wish to save (bank) permits or have permits with 255 
longer life to maximise long run utility and cover planned future events, such 256 
as long haul flights, or unexpected events. However, some respondents might 257 
see this as undermining the effectiveness of the scheme.  258 
 259 
Two levels of permit life of one year (P1) and 5 years (P5) exclude banking. 260 
The remaining  two levels both have a one year lifetime and one allows up to 261 
50% of permits to be banked for 5 years (P1_50) and the other up to 25% to 262 
be banked for 10 years (P1_25). 263 
 264 
Purchase Limits: Some might favour limiting permit purchases in order to 265 
avoid excess personal use of carbon (Bird et al., 2009) and possibly 266 
protecting against speculation. Others might regard any restriction as an 267 
excessive constraint on their quality of life or freedom. 268 
 269 
One level allows unlimited purchases (LNONE) and three levels allow the 270 
purchase of increasing amounts from a quarter (L1/4) through a half (L1/2) up 271 
to the amount of the original equal allowance (LSAME). 272 
 273 
Scope of the Scheme: A scheme could cover all energy consumption in the 274 
home and personal transport including travel by car, air, and public transport 275 
modes4.  We might expect some to have a preference for a broader scheme, 276 
                                                 
4 Embodied emissions are not included. 
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as it would offer more options for CO2 reduction. However, others might prefer 277 
modes of transport they use extensively to be omitted. 278 
 279 
Scope has three levels, covering domestic energy and all modes of transport 280 
(SALL), domestic energy, car use and air travel (SHCARAIR) and domestic 281 
energy and car use only (SHCAR). 282 
 283 
Transactions: A PCT scheme would involve the exchange of both money and 284 
carbon for goods or services. Two levels are defined, firstly, a simple pay as 285 
you go transaction where carbon is automatically deducted (TAUTO), and 286 
secondly, (TADD) which requires two transactions to be made. Some might 287 
prefer a dual transaction for reasons of trust, risk of fraud or a desire for 288 
carbon consumption monitoring whilst others might prefer the ease of a single 289 
transaction.  290 
 291 
Management of Carbon Accounts: This attribute was included to explore 292 
issues of trust and efficiency (Dresner et al., 2006; Hsu et al., 2008). The 293 
levels include two single operator options; a Central Government agency 294 
(MGOVT) and a national not for profit operator (MNAT). The remaining levels 295 
each offer some choice; a combination of a national not for profit operator and 296 
banks (MNATBANK5), a Central Government Agency and local organisations 297 
(MGOVTLOC), and an open market where any suitable operator may offer 298 
carbon accounts (MANY). 299 
 300 
                                                 
5 Note that the survey took place prior to the  2008/9 banking crisis. 
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Market Operation: Prices could be established by the free market (OMKT) or 301 
with a government set ceiling (OMKTCEIL), or could be fixed by government 302 
(OGOVT) as in the initial phase of the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme 303 
(Environment Agency et al., 2010). We might expect a preference for a 304 
regulated price to avoid the possibility of very high prices, especially by the 305 
risk averse and those on low incomes who do not always have low emissions 306 
(Dresner and Ekins 2004), although again questions of trust and also 307 
economic or political belief may influence responses. 308 
 309 
Permit Price: The permit price range encompasses recent prices of CO2 per 310 
tonne (in 2008 prices) of £42.61 from the Stern Review (Stern, 2006), the £26 311 
UK Government shadow price (Defra, 2007b), the new mitigation based 312 
central non-traded sector value of £50 (DECC, 2009) and £19.90 as the 313 
European Trading System trading price (pointcarbon.com, 24th July, 2008). 314 
The higher levels cover the expected low price elasticity of demand for fossil 315 
fuels, and the Wadud et al. (2008) finding that a $500 per tonne CO2 price 316 
would only reduce gasoline consumption in the USA by 15%, whilst the lower 317 
prices were included to assess whether they were critical to acceptability. 318 
 319 
The set up and running costs of a PCT scheme are not explicitly included due 320 
to uncertainty around available cost estimates (defra 2008b; Lockwood 2009).  321 
However, the range of the price attribute is such that the influence on 322 
acceptability of set up and running costs over and above those of a CT may 323 
be explored in the appraisal of the schemes through the price of carbon.  324 
 325 
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3.3 CT attributes 326 
The attributes and levels used to represent CT schemes are listed in Table 2. 327 
 328 
Table 2 about here 329 
 330 
How the tax works: In contrast to PCT, a CT raises revenue and the use to 331 
which this is put is likely to influence acceptability. Two of our levels have 332 
been used in other studies of PCT; RGEN denotes the option of no 333 
hypothecation, the default of the UK tax system (Bird et al., 2009), and 334 
RCHANGE represents the use of revenues to facilitate changes in behaviour 335 
(Harwatt, 2008). Owen et al., (2008) proposed that all tax revenue be recycled 336 
back to users on an equal per capita basis, here we use a variant of this 337 
approach to “mimic” the functioning of the PCT,  by giving individuals an 338 
amount of money equal to the tax paid on carbon up to 4 tonnes (RLUMP). 339 
This is similar to the CT with tax credit proposed by Read and reported by 340 
Cohen and Vandenburgh (2008). RTHRESH sets a personal allowance 341 
(similar to an income tax threshold) such that the tax is only paid on 342 
consumption above the allowance, similar to the proposal by Metcalf (2009) 343 
for a CT with a capped income tax credit in the United States.  344 
 345 
The remaining levels recycle the revenues through spending on technological 346 
solutions (RTECH), cuts in income tax (RINC) or cuts in local taxes 347 
(RCOUNCIL).  348 
 349 
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Tax Rate: The tax rates were set between £5 and £250 per tonne of CO2, 350 
largely in line with the PCT permit prices.   351 
 352 
3.4 Stated Preference exercises 353 
Two generic SP exercises were designed each of which required respondents 354 
to evaluate two options. One exercise specified these to be different PCT 355 
schemes (PCTA and PCTB) whilst in the other exercise the two options 356 
involved a comparison of PCT and CT schemes. This overall configuration 357 
places more emphasis on PCT as there are more PCT attributes to cover. 358 
Table 3 shows the two options in each SP exercise, the attributes used to 359 
describe each option and the various levels that each of these attributes could 360 
take.  361 
 362 
Given the large number of PCT attributes, and their unfamiliarity to 363 
respondents, they were split between two PCT specific exercises, denoted 364 
SP1 and SP2 in Table 3, and these cover eight of the nine PCT attributes. 365 
Permit price and allocation method were common due to their hypothesised 366 
importance. In order to simplify the evaluations, the three specific attributes 367 
(i.e., those other than price and allocation) were only varied in one of the 368 
options. For each attribute one level is common to the two options and serves 369 
as the base in the analysis.  370 
 371 
The two exercises comparing PCT and CT are termed SP3 and SP4. Here the 372 
PCT options are characterised by the same attributes as in SP1 and SP2 373 
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respectively, except that in SP3 scope replaces the transactions of SP1 so 374 
that all nine PCT attributes are covered across the four SP exercises.  375 
 376 
The sample choice cards in Appendix B show that respondents expressed a 377 
preference between the two options and indicated the acceptability of each 378 
option.  379 
 380 
Table 3 about here 381 
 382 
4. Data Collection and Characteristics 383 
 384 
The survey was implemented in two phases.  Firstly, at a Citizens Forum in 385 
Cardiff in January 2008 involving 79 respondents recruited locally to be 386 
broadly representative of the Energy Saving Trust market segmentations in 387 
order to capture a diverse range of lifestyles and opinions (RSA, 2008).  388 
Secondly, a survey in the South East of England involving 208 respondents 389 
with on-street recruitment where people were asked to participate in a survey 390 
about climate change of around 45 minutes duration and offered £10 as an 391 
incentive to participate.  Interviewers were asked to recruit respondents to 392 
achieve a spread of gender, employment type, age group and car ownership.  393 
The average carbon footprint was 5.6 tonnes CO2 split roughly 40% transport 394 
and 60% domestic energy use. During the interview, which also covered 395 
socio-economic characteristics, attitudes and behaviours, each respondent 396 
completed two separate SP exercises, one PCT v PCT and one PCT v CT.  397 
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For each exercise they were asked to look at 6 or 7 pairs of choice cards (see 398 
Appendix B for examples). 399 
 400 
The sample was fairly evenly split 52% male and 47% female (1% missing).  401 
There is also a good representation across the age groups of 18 to 29 years 402 
(24%), 30 to 44 years (30%), 45 to 60 years (24%) and over 60 (21%), with 403 
again 1% missing data. Unfortunately, 22% respondents did not disclose their 404 
income group, and therefore in the analysis employment status is a crude 405 
proxy for income.  The average household size is 2.7 with just over half the 406 
respondents living in adult only households. About half the sample live in their 407 
own homes with the rest renting or living with their family.  More than half the 408 
sample were employed full or part time. 32% of respondents are in non-car 409 
owning households, somewhat above the national average of 24% 410 
(Department for Transport, 2008). This was intentional, as car ownership was 411 
the only easily available screening question to yield an indication of carbon 412 
footprint and clearly we needed to recruit respondents both below and above 413 
our permit threshold.  414 
 415 
5. Analysis 416 
 417 
5.1 Model structure 418 
By far the most common method used to explain discrete or categorical SP 419 
data is the multinomial logit model. It is assumed that each agent i chooses 420 
that option from the n on offer which yields maximum utility (U) or satisfaction. 421 
Thus option 1 is chosen if: 422 
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 423 
1,1 ≠> nnallforUU ini                   (1) 424 
 425 
In turn, the overall utility for each option is made up of the part-worth utilities 426 
associated with a range of explanatory variables. An error term (εi) is 427 
introduced to represent the net effect of unobserved influences on an 428 
individual’s choices. Hence individual i bases decision making on what might 429 
be termed random utility which for option 1 (Ui1) is made up as: 430 
 431 
111 iii VU ε+=                               (2) 432 
 433 
Vi1 is the deterministic part of utility which can be related to those attributes 434 
(Xk), such as those characterising the SP options, which can be observed and 435 
measured. This could be represented as: 436 
 437 
∑
=
=
K
k
kiki XV
1
11 α                                                           (3) 438 
 439 
The utility functions for other options are specified in an entirely analogous 440 
fashion. As analysts, by definition we can proceed only by observation of V, 441 
yet this ignores the influence of what is to us unobservable. We cannot be 442 
sure that option 1 is preferred if Vi1 is the highest, yet the analysis must 443 
proceed on the basis of this observable component of utility alone. 444 
 445 
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The way forward is to specify the problem as one of explaining the probability 446 
of an individual choosing a particular option. We would expect the likelihood of 447 
choosing option 1 to increase as its overall random utility increases. The 448 
probability that an individual chooses option 1 (Pi1) from the n on offer can be 449 
represented as: 450 
 451 
( ) ( )[ ] 1,Pr 111 ≠+>+= nnallforVVP ininiii εε      (4) 452 
 453 
By assuming some probability distribution for the εin, the probability of 454 
choosing option 1 can be specified solely as a function of the observable 455 
component of utility. Assuming that the errors associated with each option 456 
have a type I extreme value distribution and are independently and identically 457 
distributed yields the familiar multinomial logit model (MNL):  458 
 459 
∑
=
= n
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Vij
V
i
e
eP
i
1
1
1
         (5) 460 
 461 
The coefficients of the logit model’s utility functions are estimated by 462 
maximum likelihood to provide the best explanation of individuals’ discrete 463 
choices and denote the relative importance of the attributes. We will have 464 
expectations as to the sign of the coefficient estimates. However, the absolute 465 
magnitudes of the coefficients have no meaning since they are estimated in 466 
units of residual variation. The more random error there is in the SP data and 467 
the larger the error variance, then the smaller the coefficient estimates. This 468 
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scaling does not impact on the relative importance of the coefficient estimates, 469 
since it applies equally to all coefficients, but it will impact on the use of 470 
equation 5 in forecasting mode and the greater the amount of random error 471 
and lower scale then the forecast choice probabilities will tend towards what 472 
are equal shares across the available options.  473 
 474 
There are two key dimensions to cater for in modelling. At one level, we have 475 
four SP variants, with different attributes and indeed choice contexts as is 476 
apparent in Table 3. We also have two response scales; one relating to the 477 
preference between option 1 and option 2 in Table 3 and the other a five-point 478 
acceptability rating of option 1 and option 2 separately both as depicted in 479 
Appendix B.  480 
 481 
One way forward would be to estimate four separate models for each of the 482 
SP variants dealing with preferences and additionally eight separate models 483 
of the acceptability of each of the options (6 PCT and 2 CT) in Table 3. 484 
However, this is not parsimonious and, moreover, would inevitably lead to 485 
different results for the same attributes across the different models.  486 
 487 
A better approach is to pool the data across the SP variants and the two 488 
response scales. However, such an approach needs to recognise that the 489 
separate data sets will have different amounts of random error, due to 490 
different degrees of attribute familiarity and difficulty and different response 491 
scales and choice context. Given that the coefficients of logit models are 492 
scaled inversely to the amount of random error, not to account for different 493 
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error variances across data sets could spuriously transmit an effect to an 494 
attribute that was actually due to different scale.  495 
 496 
The models were estimated using BIOGEME (Bierlaire, 2003). It contains an 497 
estimation procedure whereby a data set is selected as the ‘base’, implicitly 498 
with a scale of one, and the utility functions relating to all other data sets have 499 
an associated parameter to allow for a possibly different scale (Hess et al., 500 
2008).  501 
 502 
Each respondent yields three pieces of information per scenario; two 503 
acceptability responses and one preference. We modelled the responses as a 504 
simple binary logit. We could have instead modelled the acceptability 505 
responses as a multinomial logit, with five options covering the range of 506 
permissible responses. However, the binary model is preferred as we are 507 
ultimately interested in predicting whether a scheme is acceptable or not. 508 
Indeed, the independence of irrelevant alternatives property of multinomial 509 
logit would cause problems in forecasting acceptability since it would force, for 510 
example, the ‘cross-elasticity’ between definitely acceptable and moderately 511 
acceptable to be the same as that between definitely acceptable and definitely 512 
unacceptable when in fact there would be more ‘competition’ between the 513 
former than the latter pair.   514 
 515 
Conflating the five point scale to binary ignored the distinction between the 516 
definite and moderate categories and lost 1062 observations relating to the 517 
neither acceptable nor unacceptable category.  Option 1 in the binary logit 518 
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model denotes acceptable, and its utility is composed of the attributes used to 519 
characterise either the PCT or CT scheme, and option 2 represents 520 
unacceptable, with utility of zero. With regard to the preference data, option 1 521 
(2) was the PCT (CT) option. The pooled model contains eleven binary choice 522 
contexts covering: six PCT acceptability scenarios; two PCT preference 523 
scenarios; two PCT and CT preferences; and one dealing with the two 524 
identical CT acceptability scenarios.  In doing this pooling, we are not 525 
unreasonably assuming that the weights attached to each attribute in relative 526 
terms are the same in the acceptability and preference data, but we are 527 
allowing their absolute magnitude to vary in line with scale differences.  528 
 529 
Inspection of the pooled model indicated that, as might be expected, the 530 
scales for the seven acceptability models were generally similar. Given that 531 
different scales would be inconvenient for forecasting, all were constrained to 532 
be the same. Once this was done, the remaining four scales, covering the 533 
preferences, were each insignificantly different from one.  Hence we can 534 
remove the need to specify different scales.  535 
 536 
5.2  Pooled Model  537 
The estimated models are reported in Table 4.  All attributes other than cost 538 
are represented by dummy variables and their coefficients are interpreted 539 
relative to the clearly denoted base attribute level that is common to both 540 
options.   541 
 542 
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The models are estimated to 8731 choice observations covering 287 543 
individuals. We eliminated 1422 observations because the screen displaying 544 
the first set of SP scenarios in Cardiff was not clearly visible to all 545 
respondents, 1456 no preference and non responses and 256 observations 546 
because of a mistake in some options presented.  547 
 548 
Model I contains all attribute levels. However, our preference is for Model II 549 
which removes the 21 coefficients that were not significant at the 10% level 550 
and which generally have very low t ratios and little impact on the SP 551 
responses. We would not expect all to have a significantly different effect to 552 
their base and the removal of these insignificant coefficients increases the 553 
precision of the remaining coefficients whilst generally having only a minor 554 
impact on their magnitude.  Most of those retained are significant at the 5% 555 
level. The goodness of fit is low and no doubt the completely unknown choice 556 
contexts and unfamiliar attributes presented here will have contributed to this.  557 
The discussion below is based on Model II. 558 
 559 
Table 4 about here 560 
 561 
Permit Allocation: Four levels were insignificantly different from the base 562 
(AINDCHILD), and it is credible that respondents regard these as broadly 563 
upholding the general principle of a fair allocation. Nevertheless this includes 564 
an allocation based on current consumption (ACONS) where it may be that 565 
selfishness prevails or respondents see consumption as reflecting needs. 566 
 567 
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Whilst there is no support for financial assistance for those in greater need 568 
(AFINNEED), there is a preference for support through allocating extra 569 
permits (AEXTNEED).  This may be because it is in-kind support targeted at a 570 
recognised consumption need.  Qualitative research on PCT also found 571 
support for extra help for vulnerable groups (Bird et al., 2009; Owen et al., 572 
2008) and research on greenhouse gas reduction policies identified support 573 
for discounts to low income households (Dietz and Atkinson, 2009). 574 
 575 
Removing the allocation to children entirely (AADULT) reduces acceptability, 576 
presumably on the grounds of fairness and for some respondents, vested 577 
interest. Bird et al. (2009) and Owen et al., (2008) also found support for an 578 
allowance to children. The most unacceptable allocation is according to a 579 
government assessment of need (AGOVT). This is despite the preference for 580 
extra permits for those in greater need but is in line with objections to means 581 
testing identified by Owen et al. (2008). 582 
 583 
Excess Permits: The base is the option that gives respondents the greatest 584 
choice in the disposal of excess permits; they may be sold, donated or 585 
destroyed (ECHOOSE). EPRIV is similarly liberal and it is therefore not 586 
surprising that it is not significant.  The two levels where some restrictions are 587 
placed on disposal are regarded to be inferior, which is to be expected.  588 
 589 
Permit Life: The opportunity to be able to bank 25% for up to 10 years 590 
(P1_25) was not deemed attractive relative to the base of a one year permit 591 
life and no opportunity to bank (P1). However, there is a preference for being 592 
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able to bank 50% for 5 years (P1_50). Only half as strong was the preference 593 
for permits remaining valid for 5 years (P5). This might suggest that 594 
respondents feel that long permit life could undermine the effectiveness of the 595 
scheme.  Whilst this would not be a correct interpretation in a properly 596 
designed scheme with a cap, here and elsewhere, we are interested in 597 
respondents’ perceptions of the schemes not whether those perceptions are 598 
right or wrong. 599 
 600 
Purchase Limits: The base level is the most permissive, allowing respondents 601 
to purchase as many permits as they wish (LNONE). Acceptability would be 602 
increased by introducing a restriction, with a preference for allowing the 603 
purchase of permits up to the original allocation (LSAME). Whilst L1/4 and 604 
L1/2 were not significant, this is perhaps unsurprising given that their effects 605 
would be expected to be less than LSAME whose t ratio was not large. It 606 
seems that respondents see the need for some limits for at least two possible 607 
reasons (Harwatt, 2008; Owen et al., 2008):  firstly, a perception that the 608 
system will not work in the absence of limits; secondly, a general reluctance to 609 
let high emitters ‘buy their way out’.  610 
 611 
Scope of the Scheme: The base defines the scope of the scheme very 612 
broadly to include not only domestic energy, car and air transport but also 613 
public transport (SALL). No significant effects could be discerned for the two 614 
variations from this base. Bird et al. (2009) found mixed views on the inclusion 615 
of both aviation and public transport, which suggests that our results are not 616 
unreasonable in finding no clear preference. 617 
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 618 
Transactions: No significant difference could be discerned between the base 619 
of automatic updating of carbon accounts (TAUTO) and a system where 620 
carbon movements needed to be authorised (TADD). This is perhaps 621 
surprising; the pay as you go option was preferred in focus groups conducted 622 
by Owen et al. (2008). 623 
 624 
Management of Carbon Accounts: One option (MGOVTLOC) is not 625 
significantly different from the base of management solely by a Government 626 
Agency (MGOVT), implying that a local organisation adds little or no benefit. 627 
 628 
A single not for profit operator (MNAT) is more acceptable than government 629 
management whilst adding in high street banks strengthens this 630 
(MNATBANK). An open market (MANY) is preferred to management by 631 
government agency. Whilst, Owen et al. (2008) found that scepticism 632 
surrounding Government’s ability to run such a scheme was outweighed by 633 
objections to private operation and profit taking, in this case distrust of 634 
Government seems to prevail. 635 
 636 
Market Operation: The base allows permit price to be determined by a free 637 
market (OMKT) and is not significantly different from a market determined 638 
price with a Government set price ceiling (OMKTCEIL). However there is a 639 
preference for Government to set prices on an annual basis (OGOVT). This 640 
may reflect a preference for price certainty alongside an expectation that a 641 
Government price might be lower.  642 
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 643 
How the Tax Works: The base level was set at all carbon consumption is 644 
taxed and the revenue raised is used to reduce local council tax (RCOUNCIL). 645 
Three other options which also tax all carbon consumption but use the 646 
revenues to cut income tax (RINC), provide a lump sum amount of money 647 
(RLUMP) and stimulate energy efficiency (RTECH) were all insignificantly 648 
different. This is perhaps unsurprising.  On the other hand, a scheme would 649 
be less acceptable if all carbon consumption was taxed and revenues simply 650 
went into the general tax budget (RGEN). This preference for hypothecation is 651 
in line with the overwhelming findings regarding public acceptability of road 652 
user pricing (Jaensirisak et al., 2005). 653 
 654 
There is, however, a strong preference for an exemption from the tax up to the 655 
4 tonnes threshold (RTHRESH). This is preferred to RLUMP even though the 656 
latter would give a greater benefit to low carbon users and the two schemes 657 
would be the same for high carbon users.  It may be that exemption 658 
thresholds are a familiar concept and perceived to be efficient due to their 659 
ease of application, whereas some might not believe that the government 660 
would make lump sum payments. Using the carbon tax revenues to make it 661 
easier to change behaviour and reduce consumption of carbon (RCHANGE) 662 
was also strongly favoured over their use for financial compensation. 663 
Interestingly, Dresner et al. (2006) and IPSOS MORI (2006) found stronger 664 
support for taxation of energy and aviation respectively where revenues were 665 
recycled into environmental expenditures rather than tax cuts. 666 
 667 
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Permit Price / Tax Rate: The cost attributes represent the total cost that would 668 
be incurred given the permit price or the carbon tax rate and each individual’s 669 
carbon footprint. We specified separate cost attributes for those consuming 670 
over 4 tonnes who have to purchase permits to support the excess 671 
consumption (CostPCTH) and the remainder who can sell permits (CostPCTL) 672 
where a positive coefficient is expected.  673 
 674 
The specification of the total cost under CT (CostCT) proceeds similarly. All 675 
carbon is taxed except when the ‘how tax works’ attribute takes the level 676 
RTHRESH, whereupon the tax applies only to consumption above the 4 677 
tonnes threshold. When the ‘how the tax works’ attribute takes the level  678 
RLUMP, there is a lump sum payment equal to 4 times the tax rate. Thus 679 
those whose carbon footprint is lower than 4 tonnes will gain and we define a 680 
cost term (CostCTG) with an expected positive coefficient. 681 
 682 
The coefficient estimates where respondents gain financially were both 683 
insignificant. This is not surprising in the context of CT since the lump sum 684 
payment occurs only a few times. In general, Owen et al. (2008) noted that 685 
respondents focused on costs and were less likely to discuss gains even 686 
when these were explicitly pointed out to them.  Insignificant cost coefficients 687 
on reductions in local tax/utility bills have been found in other SP experiments 688 
(Wardman and Bristow, 2008; Lanz et al., 2009). Whilst commonly attributed 689 
to loss aversion, it could also be due to a lack of trust that the reduction would 690 
materialise. 691 
 692 
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For those who would pay, the cost coefficients are amongst the most precisely 693 
estimated. CostCT exceeds CostPCTH and this may reflect respondents’ 694 
greater familiarity with a tax instrument and/or a higher level of expectation 695 
that a tax might be implemented.  In addition, there is the opportunity for some 696 
under PCT to change behaviour so as to be permit sellers rather than buyers 697 
and this would operate to reduce the CostPCTH coefficient6.   698 
 699 
Alternative Specific Constants (ASCs): Such constants discern the net effect 700 
on utility of unobserved variables, such as, say, basic attitudes toward PCT7 701 
or CT all else equal, as well as the utility associated with the base levels of the 702 
categorical variables. ASCs were specified for PCT and CT and also options 703 
with different common base categories. Four ASCs were statistically 704 
significant covering the acceptability of the two PCT options in SP1 (ASC1), 705 
the PCT options in SP2 and SP4 (ASC2), the PCT option in SP3 (ASC3) and 706 
CT in SP3 and SP4 (ASC4).   707 
 708 
ASC1 denotes that together the base levels of AINDCHILD, P1, TAUTO and 709 
MGOVT reduce acceptability. This is also the case for AINDCHILD, P1, SALL 710 
and MGOVT in ASC3.  It would seem that the widespread scope of the 711 
scheme (SALL) contributes much more to unacceptability than does the 712 
automatic updating of carbon accounts (TAUTO). This seems credible. 713 
 714 
                                                 
6 Data on potential behavioural response was available from the survey. However, the use of 
this “post implementation” data did not improve the models. 
7 This could include any views respondents might have on the additional set up and 
administration costs of a PCT scheme. 
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ASC2 increases acceptability and covers the base categories of AINDCHILD, 715 
LNONE, OMKT and ECHOOSE.  Whilst OMKT would be expected to be 716 
unattractive, the other two levels are the most permissive and hence offset the 717 
latter.  718 
 719 
ASC4 covers the base CT level of RCOUNCIL and, relative to the other 720 
ASCs, any inherent relative preference amongst CT and PCT. It also 721 
increases acceptability. This is perhaps unsurprising, since RCOUNCIL 722 
involves the recycling of all revenues.  723 
 724 
Other issues:  We allowed for systematic variation in parameters according to 725 
the socio-economic and carbon use characteristics of respondents by 726 
specifying interactions between these and the main effects.  However, we 727 
were only able to obtain a very small number of intuitively expected and 728 
statistically significant effects.  For example, households with children prefer 729 
allowances to include children and car users prefer more generous permit life 730 
and buying opportunities as did those with a low carbon footprint, this last 731 
being less expected.  Even then, the magnitude of the incremental effects was 732 
minor. The level of precision with which the main parameters were estimated, 733 
to which the relatively small sample size and unfamiliar choice context 734 
contribute, is not conducive to discerning significant and strong socio-735 
economic effects.  Moreover it is important to remember that many attribute 736 
levels may be regarded positively or negatively depending on a respondent’s 737 
attitudes and context, and this greater randomness will hamper efforts to 738 
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identify systematic effects.  We experimented with random parameter 739 
specification on some coefficients (e.g. cost) but this was not successful. 740 
 741 
5.3 Model Application 742 
The model can be used to forecast how scheme composition may impact on 743 
acceptability. This provides insights not readily transparent from the results in 744 
Table 4 and which would also be of fundamental interest to policy makers 745 
confronted with policy design and presentation challenges. 746 
 747 
We use the estimated logit model in ‘forecasting mode’ to determine the 748 
probability that a particular PCT or CT scenario is acceptable. In this binary 749 
case, the multinomial logit model of equation 5 simplifies to: 750 
 751 
121
1
1 VVe
P −+=          (6) 752 
 753 
 754 
The probability that the scenario is acceptable (P1) is a function of the 755 
difference in the utility of option 1 and option 2. The utility of option 2 (V2), as 756 
we have stated, is set to zero. The utility of option 1 (V1) represents a 757 
particular set of attributes that compose a scenario along with the weights 758 
estimated for the relevant attributes and reported in Table 4. Taking the fourth 759 
scenario in Table 5, where the PCT scenario specifies allocation as 760 
AEXTNEED, the life of the permits as P1_50, scope as SALL, and the 761 
management as MNATBANK, and for a carbon footprint 1.6 tonnes in excess 762 
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of the allowance (CF-CA=1.6) with a permit price of £100 per tonne, the utility 763 
function is: 764 
 765 
025.0)(000204.0319.0
0.050_1301.0350.0962.01
−=−−+
+++−=
HCostPCTCACFMNATBANK
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766 
  767 
 768 
which in equation 6 yields a probability of acceptability of 0.49. In other words, 769 
49% of individuals if confronted with this situation would find it to be 770 
acceptable.  771 
 772 
Illustrative forecasts are presented in Table 5. The scenarios are based 773 
around those actually offered in the SP exercise. These are for PCT as in SP3 774 
(Scenarios 1-5), PCT as in SP2 and SP4 (Scenarios 6-12) and CT (Scenarios 775 
13-16). We cover the base attributes and levels and the largest of any 776 
significantly positive or negative variations from the base. Three price or tax 777 
levels are used ranging from something close to the current price of carbon 778 
(£25) to higher levels (£100 and £250).  Four levels of carbon footprint (CF) 779 
are examined relative to the carbon allowance (CA): 4 tonnes, where CF–CA 780 
equals zero; 5.6 tonnes, which is our sample mean; a much higher level of 10 781 
tonnes, given around 15% of our sample has a footprint at least this large; and 782 
a mid-point of the latter two of 7.8 tonnes.  Whilst we could have directly 783 
evaluated PCT schemes relative to CT schemes, thereby obtaining a 784 
probability that PCT is preferred over CT, the absolute acceptability 785 
probabilities reported in Table 5 indicate the relative attractiveness of 786 
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particular PCT and CT schemes which would be sufficient for policy purposes 787 
in selecting a preferred scheme given that they are mutually exclusive.   788 
 789 
Table 5 about here 790 
 791 
What is immediately apparent from Table 5 is that the price of carbon has very 792 
little impact on the level of PCT acceptability. This is an intriguing finding; we 793 
might expect, and it is often observed, protest response towards increased 794 
financial outlay in SP models. Respondents had every opportunity to respond 795 
strategically to cost. Whilst the very hypothetical nature of the SP exercise 796 
might militate against such protest response, there is no obvious reason why 797 
respondents should systematically understate their sensitivity to permit price. 798 
The surprisingly low cost coefficient also implies little variation in PCT 799 
acceptability according to the level of carbon consumption, but note that we 800 
were unable to detect significant variations in other parameter estimates 801 
according the current level of carbon consumption. However, for CT we 802 
observe some large variations in acceptability, particularly amongst high 803 
carbon consumers, as the carbon tax varies.  804 
 805 
There is a considerable amount of variation in acceptability according to 806 
scheme design, to the extent that CT can often be more acceptable than PCT 807 
for comparable financial cost (RTHRESH). However, PCT can be made more 808 
attractive than CT. Indeed, we observe that amongst our sample PCT and CT 809 
can each be politically acceptable.  810 
 811 
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PCT acceptability is seen to be critically dependent on the initial allocation of 812 
permits, where the move from worst (AGOVT) to best (AEXTNEED) can 813 
improve acceptability by over 25 percentage points. Here we find a preference 814 
not just for fairness in terms of an equal distribution but also one that reflects 815 
need. Other attributes also have a strong bearing on the acceptability of PCT. 816 
The highest levels of PCT acceptability, for scenario 9, reach 80%.   817 
 818 
Similarly the acceptability of CT can vary by almost 20 percentage points 819 
according to how the tax works. The highest level of acceptability of CT, when 820 
there is a tax free threshold of 4 tonnes of carbon, as in scenario 14, is not far 821 
off 70%.  822 
 823 
We can consider the potential additional set up and operational costs of a 824 
PCT over and above those of CT utilising the recent analysis by Lockwood 825 
(2009) who estimates an annual additional cost per person of approximately 826 
£50 based on defra central estimates and his own central estimate of £28.  If 827 
we assume a tax of £50 for the CT based on the new cost of carbon (DECC, 828 
2009) and a price per tonne of £78 to £100 for the PCT and compare 829 
acceptability, for the “best” designs and average carbon consumption, we find 830 
that the CT achieves 67% acceptance and the PCT 79% acceptance.  This 831 
suggests that set up costs may not be a deal breaker for PCT. However, if 832 
these costs were outlined to respondents as set up and running costs we 833 
must recognise the possibility that the results could have been different. 834 
 835 
6. Conclusions 836 
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 837 
This highly exploratory and novel study indicates that design has a critical 838 
influence on scheme acceptability for both PCT and CT.  It follows that there 839 
is no unique preference for PCT relative to CT since it depends upon the 840 
features of the scheme.  841 
 842 
Our findings indicate a preference for permit allocations that are fair where 843 
allocations that include children are preferred to those that do not and 844 
allocations with additional allowance for those with extra needs are preferred 845 
to those without. With respect to CT, preferences are for the revenue to be 846 
used for threshold exemptions or measures to facilitate change. These reflect 847 
findings elsewhere and thus increase our confidence in the findings with 848 
respect to less familiar attributes.  849 
 850 
Our model predicts that the acceptability of PCT can reach 80% whilst that for 851 
CT can approximate 70%. This is without the PCT model being able to 852 
attribute a benefit to the 40% of our sample who would be in a position to sell 853 
permits, although we suspect that this benefit of PCT will have worked 854 
through into the other parameter estimates, particularly the constants, and 855 
that this will have contributed to the high acceptability of PCT.   856 
 857 
A key result is that a PCT or CT can be politically acceptable. This is not as 858 
implausible as it first seems. Firstly, previous studies, admittedly with fixed 859 
designs, do evidence reasonable degrees of acceptability. Secondly, there are 860 
a large number of beneficiaries under our PCT scheme. Whilst this argument 861 
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does not apply to CT in general, that offered here aims to address serious 862 
environmental challenges and typically returns the money raised which will 863 
contribute to its popularity. Indeed, the CT fails to achieve 50% acceptability 864 
when the tax revenue is not hypothecated. 865 
 866 
Clearly, the issue of the public acceptability of measures that seriously 867 
address individual carbon emissions is of considerable political interest, and 868 
identifying the best scheme is critical for policy makers. Much further work 869 
needs to be conducted to build upon what we believe is pioneering research. 870 
Larger samples are needed to support more detailed analysis, particularly of 871 
systematic and random taste variation, whilst means of improving the clarity 872 
and range of scheme representation to finesse design and explore a wider 873 
range of measures and their financial implications are required. There are a 874 
range of aspects that we were not able to test systematically in this study, 875 
including the impact on acceptability of the way the scheme is described and 876 
explicit consideration of the influence of the setup and running costs of a PCT 877 
scheme. The analysis might extend to involve an international dimension 878 
whereby the acceptability of domestic policies is a function of international 879 
actions. 880 
 881 
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APPENDIX A Description of the two schemes as they appeared to 1197 
respondents 1198 
 1199 
INTRODUCTION TO CARBON TAX 
This would be a tax on all purchases of energy that contribute to climate change. This would include: 
• Gas 
• Electricity 
• Petrol / diesel 
• Heating oil, coal or wood. 
This would increase the cost of all energy forms that contain carbon. 
This higher price would reflect the cost to the environment and would make us think about: 
• Conserving energy 
• Changing what we do - installing or buying solar or wind power, using public transport 
instead of driving 
Such a tax would generate money for the Government. This money could be used for a range of 
purposes: 
• Reducing other taxes, such as income tax 
• Investing in energy saving technologies or options, such as public transport or renewable 
energy. 
• Measures to help individuals to change their behaviour or reduce consumption, home 
insulation grants, public transport etc. 
• Give some money back to individuals directly. 
 
TO SUM UP: 
Everyone pays the same rate of tax regardless of income - in the same way as current purchase taxes. 
The design could include lump sum payments, cuts in other taxes or expenditure on carbon reduction 
measures. 
In this example we want you to consider that all carbon is taxed and the Government gives a tax refund 
up to the average carbon consumption. This means that only above average consumers pay more. 
 
INTRODUCTION TO PERSONAL CARBON TRADING 
The purchase and use of energy that contributes to climate change, gas, electricity, petrol /diesel, coal / 
oil / wood would require you to provide carbon permits for that amount of energy. 
We are asking you to consider only your personal travel including commuting to a place of work but 
not business travel. Businesses would be subject to a similar scheme to encourage the reduction of 
emissions. 
 
Allowance 
All adults would be given an equal and free allowance of permits. Initially, in the first year this would 
be based on average carbon consumption. After that the allowance would gradually reduce to 
encourage reductions in carbon use. 
 
Functioning 
Every time you buy petrol /diesel or pay a gas or electricity bill the relevant number of permits would 
be deducted from your account. 
If you do not have enough permits for a purchase you will need to buy additional ones 
If you do not use all of your permit allowance you can sell them for money. 
The principle is that people who need extra permits may buy them from people who have some in 
excess, and vice versa. 
The aim would be to reduce emissions of carbon. A PCT (Personal Carbon Trading) would encourage 
people to do this to avoid having to buy permits or to allow them to sell spare permits. 
We are now going to describe how a scheme might work and ask you about your response to it.
Adults would receive an equal allowance of 4.0 tonnes of CO2. 
Those with children would receive an additional, smaller allowance for each child under 18. 
 1200 
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APPENDIX B Example Choice Cards from the two stated preference 1202 
experiments 1203 
Choice Card 2 
ATTRIBUTE Option 1 Option 2 
Allocation of permits 
equal allocation to all 
people including 
children 
allocation to adults 
based on a government 
assessment of needs 
Permit sale / purchase £100 per tonne of CO2 £50 per tonne of CO2 
 
Purchase limits 
you may sell or buy as 
many permits as you 
like 
purchases are limited to 
1/4 of your local 
allocation 
 
Price is set by 
the market determines 
the price - no limits 
the market determines 
the price - government 
sets a price ceiling 
 
Excess permits 
you can choose whether 
to sell excess permits in 
the market, donate or 
destroy them 
you can choose whether 
to sell excess permits in 
the market, donate or 
destroy them 
 1204 
 
I would prefer 
 
Option 1 
 
 
 
 
Option 2 
 
 
I find option 1 
Highly 
acceptable 
 
 
 
 
Moderately 
acceptable 
 
 
 
 
Neither 
acceptable 
nor 
unacceptable 
 
 
 
Moderately 
unacceptable 
 
 
 
 
Highly 
unacceptable 
 
 
 
 
I find option 2 
Highly 
acceptable 
 
 
 
 
Moderately 
acceptable 
 
 
 
 
Neither 
acceptable 
nor 
unacceptable 
 
 
 
Moderately 
unacceptable 
 
 
 
 
Highly 
unacceptable 
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 1213 
 1214 
 1215 
 1216 
Choice Card 2 
ATTRIBUTE 
PCT Option 1 Option 2 
ATTRIBUTE 
TAX 
Allocation of 
permits 
equal allocation to all 
adults, children get 40% 
of adult allowance 
 
all adults are given an 
exemption from the 
tax - up to the 4 
tonnes CO2, like an 
income tax threshold 
 
How the tax works
Permit sale / 
purchase £250 per tonne of CO2 £10 per tonne of CO2 
Cost per tonne 
CO2  
An independent 
regulator 
oversees 
management of 
carbon accounts 
provided by: 
 
a central government 
agency   
Lifetime of 
permits 
 
permits expire after one 
year but 50% may be 
banked for up to 5 years 
 
  
Scope of the 
scheme 
 
emissions from the 
home and all transport 
use: private car, public 
transport and air travel 
 
  
 
I would prefer 
Option 1 
 
 
Option 2 
 
 
I find Option 1 
Highly 
acceptable 
 
 
 
 
Moderately 
acceptable 
 
 
 
 
Neither 
acceptable nor 
unacceptable 
 
 
 
Moderately 
unacceptable 
 
 
 
 
Highly 
unacceptable 
 
 
 
 
I find Option 2  
Highly 
acceptable 
 
 
 
 
Moderately 
acceptable 
 
 
 
Neither 
acceptable nor 
unacceptable 
 
 
Moderately 
unacceptable 
 
 
 
Highly 
unacceptable 
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Table 1: PCT Attributes and Levels 1219 
Attributes and levels Code 
Permit Allocation   
Equal Allocation to all people including children  AINDCHILD 
Equal Allocation to all adults, children get 40% of adult 
allowance 
AIND40 
Equal Allocation to all adults, no allocation to children AADULT 
Allocation according to current levels of consumption ACONS 
Equal allocation to all with extra permits for those with greater 
need, for example, living in rural area, poor housing or 
disability AEXTNEED 
Equal allocation to all households AHOUSE 
Allocation to adults based on a Government, assessment of 
needs AGOVT 
Equal allocation to all but additional financial support for those 
with greater need, for example, living in rural area, poor 
housing, disabilities AFINNEED 
Excess permits   
Excess permits must be sold in the market EMKT 
Excess permits may be sold privately to whoever you wish 
EPRIV 
Excess permits must be sold in the market or donated to 
charity EMKTCHY 
You can choose whether to sell excess permits in the market, 
donate or destroy them ECHOOSE 
Permit life   
All permits expire after 1 year P1 
All permits expire after 5 years P5 
Permits expire after 1 year but 50% may be banked for up to 5 
years P1_50 
Permits expire after 1 year but 25% may be banked for up to 
10 years P1_25 
Purchase Limits   
You may sell or buy as many permits as you like LNONE 
Purchases are limited to ¼ of your allocation 
L1/4 
Purchases are limited to ½ of your allocation L1/2 
You may purchase up to same amount of your original 
allocation LSAME 
Scope of the scheme   
Emissions from the home and all transport use, car, public 
transport and air travel 
SALL 
Emissions from the home and private car use only SHCAR 
Emissions from the home, private car and air transport. SHCARAIR 
 55
Transactions   
Carbon account automatically updated, you do not need to do 
anything extra. 
TAUTO 
An additional transaction, you need to authorise any carbon 
movements in and out of account TADD 
An independent regulator oversees the management of 
carbon accounts provided by: 
 
A Central Government agency MGOVT 
A single not for profit organisation MNAT 
A single not for profit organisation and high street banks MNATBANK 
A Central Government Agency + local organisations MGOVTLOC 
Any organisation meeting a set standard to provide carbon 
accounts MANY 
Market operation   
Government sets the price of permits on an annual basis OGOVT 
The market determines the price – no limits  
OMKT 
The market determines the price government sets a price 
ceiling OMKTCEIL 
Permit Price    
£5, £10, £25, £50, £100, £250, £500 per annual tonne of CO2  
 1220 
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Table 2: CT Attributes and Levels 1222 
Attributes and levels Code 
How tax works   
All carbon consumption is taxed, no hypothecation - revenues 
go to the general tax budget RGEN 
All carbon consumption is taxed and the revenue is spent on 
technology to improve energy efficiency RTECH 
All carbon consumption is taxed and the revenue is spent on 
measures such as more public transport to make it easier for 
individuals to change their behaviour 
RCHANGE 
All carbon consumption is taxed and the  revenue is used to 
cut income tax RINC 
All carbon consumption is taxed and all the  revenue is used 
to cut council tax 
RCOUNCIL 
All carbon consumption is taxed. All adults are given a lump 
sum £X 
RLUMP 
All adults are given an exemption from the tax – up to the 4 
tonnes CO2, like an income tax threshold. 
RTHRESH 
Tax Rate  
£5, £10, £20, £50, £100, £150, £250 per tonne of CO2   
 1223 
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Table 3: Attributes and Levels in each SP Exercise 1224 
 Option 1 Option 2 
 PCTA PCTB 
SP1 Permit 
Price 
Permit 
Allocation 
Permit 
Life 
Transactions Management 
of Carbon 
Accounts 
Permit 
Price 
Permit 
Allocation 
Permit 
Life 
Transactions Management 
of Carbon 
Accounts 
£5 
£25 
£50 
£100 
£500 
AINDCHILD 
AIND40 
AADULT 
ACONS 
AEXTNEED 
P1 TAUTO MGOVT 
MNAT 
MNATBANK 
MGOVTLOC 
MANY 
£5 
£10 
£25 
£50 
£250 
AINDCHILD 
ACONS 
AHOUSE 
AGOVT 
AFINNEED 
P1 
P5 
P1_50 
P1_25 
TAUTO 
TADD 
MGOVT 
SP2 Permit 
Price 
Permit 
Allocation 
Purchase 
Limits 
Market 
Operation 
Excess 
Permits 
Permit 
Price 
Permit 
Allocation 
Purchase 
Limits 
Market 
Operation 
Excess 
Permits 
£5 
£25 
£50 
£100 
£500 
AINDCHILD 
AIND40 
AADULT 
ACONS 
AEXTNEED 
LNONE OMKT ECHOOSE 
EMKTCHY 
EPRIV 
EMKT 
£5 
£10 
£25 
£50 
£250 
AINDCHILD 
ACONS 
AHOUSE 
AGOVT 
AFINNEED 
LNONE 
L1/4 
L1/2 
LSAME 
OMKT 
OGOVT 
OMKTCEIL 
ECHOOSE 
 PCT CT 
SP3 Permit 
Price 
Permit 
Allocation 
Permit 
Life 
Scope of the 
Scheme 
Management 
of Carbon 
Accounts 
Tax 
Rate 
How Tax 
Works 
   
£5 
£10 
£25 
£50 
£100 
£250 
£500 
AINDCHILD 
AIND40 
AADULT 
ACONS 
 
P1 
P5 
P1_50 
P1_25 
SALL 
SHCAR 
SHCARAIR 
MGOVT 
MNAT 
MNATBANK 
MGOVTLOC 
MANY 
£5 
£10 
£20 
£50 
£100 
£150 
£250 
RGEN 
RTECH 
RCHANGE 
RINC 
RCOUNCIL 
RLUMP 
RTHRESH 
   
SP4 Permit 
Price 
Permit 
Allocation 
Purchase 
Limits 
Market 
Operation 
Excess 
Permits 
Tax 
Rate 
How Tax 
Works 
   
£5 AINDCHILD LNONE OMKT ECHOOSE £5 RGEN    
 58 
£10 
£25 
£50 
£100 
£250 
£500 
AIND40 
AADULT 
ACONS 
 
L1/4 
L1/2 
LSAME 
OGOVT 
OMKTCEIL 
EMKTCHY 
EPRIV 
EMKT 
£10 
£20 
£50 
£100 
£150 
£250 
RTECH 
RCHANGE 
RINC 
RCOUNCIL 
RLUMP 
RTHRESH 
 59
 1225 
Table 4: Full and Preferred Models 1226 
 1227 
Attribute Model I Model II Attribute Model I Model II 
Permit Allocation   Management of 
Carbon Accounts 
  
AINDCHILD Base Base MGOVT Base Base
AIND40 -0.033 (0.5) n.s MNAT 0.251 (2.4) 0.268 (2.8)
AADULT -0.165 (2.2) -0.172 (2.7) MNATBANK 0.305 (2.4) 0.319 (2.7)
ACONS -0.064 (1.0) n.s MGOVTLOC -0.119 (0.9) n.s
AEXTNEED 0.357 (3.3) 0.350 (3.4) MANY 0.216 (1.7) 0.233 (1.8)
AHOUSE 0.108 (1.0) n.s Market Operation   
AGOVT -0.321 (2.8) -0.289 (2.8) OMKT Base Base
AFINNEED -0.032 (0.3) n.s OGOVT 0.269 (3.4) 0.242 (3.8)
Excess Permits   OMKTCEIL 0.106 (1.2) n.s
ECHOOSE Base Base How tax works   
EMKT -0.112 (1.7) -0.145 (2.5) RCOUNCIL Base Base
EPRIV -0.019 (0.2) n.s RINC -0.177 (1.2) n.s
EMKTCHY -0.157 (1.6) -0.182 (1.9) RLUMP -0.116 (0.8) n.s
Permit Life   RTHRESH 0.429 (2.9) 0.558 (4.9)
P1 Base Base RGEN -0.400 (2.8) -0.277 (2.6)
P5 0.140 (1.4) 0.165 (1.8) RTECH 0.0233 (0.2) n.s
P1_25 -0.019 (0.1) n.s RCHANGE 0.335 (2.3) 0.454 (4.2)
P1_50 0.272 (2.6) 0.301 (3.2) Permit Price / Tax 
Rate 
  
Purchase Limits  CostPCTH  -0.000196 (5.1) -0.000204 (5.3)
LNONE Base Base CostPCTL 0000098 (0.9) n.s
L1/4 0.071 (0.8) n.s CostCT -0.000449 (6.4) -0.000398 (6.2)
L1/2 0.022 (0.3) n.s CostCTG -0.00124 (1.6) n.s
LSAME 0.391 (2.5) 0.402 (2.7) ASCs   
Scope of the 
Scheme 
 ASC1  -0.624 (7.3) -0.651 (9.9)
SALL Base Base ASC2 0.324 (4.2) 0.376 (6.4)
SHCAR 0.216 (1.1) n.s ASC3 -1.00 (5.8) -0.962 (8.5)
SHCARAIR 0.095 (0.5) n.s ASC4  0.374 (3.3) 0.255 (3.8)
Transactions  ASC5 -0.202 (1.6) n.s
TAUTO Base Base Adjusted ρ2 0.034 0.035
TADD 0.026 (0.3) n.s Log likelihood -5808.34 -5817.25
 1228 
Note: Coefficient estimate with t ratio in parentheses 1229 
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Table 5: Forecast Levels of Acceptability  1230 
 CF=CA8 
= 0 
CF-CA = 1.6 CF-CA = 3.8  CF-CA = 6 
 Permit Price 
      £25 £100 £250 £25 £100 £250 £25 £100 £250 
 Permit 
Allocation 
Permit Life Scope of 
the 
Scheme 
Management 
of Carbon 
Accounts 
          
1 AINDCHILD P1 SALL MGOVT 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.22 
2 AINDCHILD P1 SALL MNATBANK 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.30 0.34 0.32 0.28 
3 AINDCHILD P1_50 SALL MNATBANK 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.37 0.41 0.39 0.34 
4 AEXTNEED P1_50 SALL MNATBANK 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.45 0.49 0.47 0.43 
5 AGOVT P1 SALL MGOVT 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.17 
 Permit 
Allocation 
Purchase 
Limits 
Market 
Operation 
Excess 
Permits 
          
6 AINDCHILD LNONE OMKT ECHOOSE 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.57 0.59 0.57 0.55 0.59 0.56 0.52 
7 AINDCHILD LNONE OGOVT ECHOOSE 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.63 0.60 0.64 0.62 0.58 
8 AINDCHILD LSAME OGOVT ECHOOSE 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.73 0.71 0.67 
9 AEXTNEED LSAME OGOVT ECHOOSE 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.76 0.79 0.78 0.74 
10 AINDCHILD LNONE OMKT EMKTCHY 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.54 0.52 0.47 
11 AGOVT LNONE OMKT EMKTCHY 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.43 0.47 0.45 0.40 
12 AEXTNEED LNONE OMKT ECHOOSE 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.67 0.65 0.60 
 CF=4 CF= 5.6 CF= 7.8 CF=10 
 Tax Rate 
 How Tax Works £25 £100 £250 £25 £100 £250 £25 £100 £250 £25 £100 £250 
13 RCOUNCIL 0.55 0.52 0.46 0.55 0.51 0.43 0.54 0.49 0.37 0.54 0.46 0.32 
14 RTHRESH 0.68 0.66 0.60 0.68 0.64 0.56 0.68 0.62 0.51 0.67 0.60 0.45 
15 RCHANGE 0.66 0.63 0.58 0.66 0.62 0.54 0.65 0.60 0.48 0.65 0.58 0.43 
16 RGEN 0.48 0.45 0.40 0.48 0.44 0.36 0.48 0.42 0.31 0.47 0.40 0.27 
                                                 
8 Where CF = Carbon Footprint, CA = Carbon Allowance 
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